

Introcution

Art. 5 TEU allows the EU to act outside its direct areas of competence (such as taxes) where the objective of the Treaties (Treaty on the European Union - TEU and TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) cannot be achieved by national laws (Principle of Subsidiarity, Art. 5(3) TEU).

Therefore, although as established in the case law Gilly/Saint Gobain, the lack of harmonized rules on direct taxation unlike with indirect taxation, which is harmonised) the power of allocating taxing rights resides with individual States, even though EU Member States (MS) as part of their shared competence under Art. 4 TEU are required to ensure their legislation complies with EU law under the principle of Supremacy (Costa v Enel).

This means where there is a conflict between national law and EU law, EU law takes priority (also over double taxation agreements (DTCs) - as established in the case law Avoir fiscal) which ensures that national law / DTCs do not infringe with EU provisions and in particular not with the fundamental freedoms of the EU, which are:

- Free movement of citizens (move and reside freely) - Art. 21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
- Free movement of goods - Art. 28 TFEU
- Free movement of Workers - Art. 45 TFEU
- Freedom of Establishment (FoE) - Art. 49 TFEU
- Free movement of Services - Art. 56 TFEU
- Free movement of Capital (FMoC) - Art. 63 TFEU.

as established in various case laws such as Schumacker, Marks & Spencer, ITCAR, De Groot etc., which ensures EU law prevails (Erich Ciola) and Member States (MS) refrain from implementing any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU objectives (Art. 4(3) TEU).

In Stauder case law it was also established that EU law should be interpreted applied in a uniform way. Also, in EUROPARK Service it was established that where the matter in hand falls within the remit of harmonization rules, the latter take priority over primary law. Whereas,

per Jacob/Jassus should the matter fall outside the remit of harmonisation rules, primary law will apply.

It is also worth mentioning that should a dispute arise and be brought before the Court of Justice (of the EU CJEU), the latter will not give a ruling on the interpretation of DTs (however, it did so in (Austria v Germany), because it was asked to act as an arbitrator), on hypothetical situations, on interpretation of national laws or engage in fact findings. It might however, offer additional interpretation if it feels appropriate to do so.

Having said all the above, just because a potential breach of a fundamental freedom is identified this does not automatically mean the measure must be withdrawn.

It might be justified and if justified, it could be deemed proportionate (art. 5(4) TEU - principle of proportionality) - see also Cases Cassis de Dijon / Gebhard).

Question 1

Facts

- ABC resident in A moved place of effective management to B
- MS A applied Exit Tax on value of assets leaving territory of A
- MS A allows for deferral of payment exit tax over 5 years
- MS A asks for interest if deferral of payment.

Freedom & Infringement

In this case the Freedom of Establishment, Art. 49 TFEU or the Free movement of Capital (Art. 63 TFEU) could be infringed.

If two freedoms could be affected the aim and the purpose of the legislation must be taken into account (Case FII Group). The Free movement of capital is affected if the mere capital investment is concerned, which is likely not the case here. The freedom of establishment is affected, if it is about the control or interest in a company, which is the case here as ABC Corporation moved the seat from MS A to B (Case law *Impresso Pesarotti* and *Hornbach-Baumarkt*).

ABC Corporation could suffer from a discrimination of the freedom of establishment. The exit taxes imposed by MS A restrict ABC from moving

the place of effective management to B. However, this restriction could be justified if it is proportionate.

Justification & Proportionality

The imposed exit tax on ABC from MS A could be justified. It is important to note that the EU has via the ATAD Directive introduced exit taxation as a minimum standard in the EU, to harmonize to a minimum standard the rules for direct taxation. Exit taxes can hinder a freedom, as they impose the payment of a tax, even though no actual sell of an asset (cash event) has taken place. Thus it is a burden for the tax payer to pay exit taxes, if they have not actually sold the asset for cash. Art. 5 ATAD is the relevant norm for exit taxes. Thus exit taxes are justified. Especially as the exit taxes from MS A also allow for the deferral of the payment over five years (in installments) - which is in line with ATAD. The justification is based on the balance allocation of taxing right between MS (see e.g. Cases NGI and Hornbach-Baumarkt). The question may be if the imposition of interest on the exit tax is proportionate. Recently interest has been imposed on exit taxes by MS which has also been discussed in more recent case laws. The interest can be seen as proportionate under the Finance principle of time value of money. If MS A gets the taxes later, the value of the money (taxes) has changed. Therefore, interest claim on exit tax is proportionate.

Recent cases concerning the freedom of establishment and exit taxation are: Verder LabTech, National Grid Indus and Commission V Germany (the latter on the topic of the immediate payment of exit taxes or the deferral).

Conclusion

Interest claim on exit tax is against the freedom of establishment but is justified and proportionate.

Question 2

MS B is obliged to accept the market value established by MS A. ATAD Directive Art. 6 defines the „market value“ as the amount for which an asset can be exchanged. For tax purposes MS B must accept the market value stipulated from MS A. However, if the value of the asset may change in the future due to the actual sell of the asset, MS B is not obliged to accept the changed value (as seen in recent case law such as

NGI) .

Question 3

A similar situation has been observed in the NGI Case law. According to para. 58 of the case the CJEU stated that the host member State B must allow the change in the value of the transferred asset (here loss) for tax purposes, if the change of value took place after the asset transfer, based on the principle of fiscal territoriality linked with a temporal component (caution, differently seen in the Case Law N)

Question 4

If the transfer took place to a third country, which is not a Member State of the EU, it could be argued an EU freedom has not been infringed. However, if A charges Exit taxes immediately, this will lead to great financial burden for ABC, as no actual Cash event took place. Thus ABC may not have the money to pay the exit tax.

-----ANSWER-1-
ABOVE-----

-----ANSWER-2-
BELOW-----

Answer-to-Question- 2 Part A

From: ADIT Student

TO: MS A

Subject: Memorandum on the compatibility of the planned group tax regime under EU law

To whom it may concern:

Introcution

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Therefore, although as established in the case law Gilly/Saint Gobain, the lack of harmonized rules on direct taxation (unlike with indirect taxation, which is harmonised) the power of allocating taxing rights resides with individual States, even though EU Member States (MS) as part of their shared competence under Art. 4 TEU are required to ensure their legislation complies with EU law under the principle of Supremacy (Costa v Enel).

This means where there is a conflict between national law and EU law, EU law takes priority (also over double taxation agreements (DTAs) - as established in the case law Avoir fiscal) which ensures that national law / DTAs do not infringe with EU provisions and in particular not with the fundamental freedoms of the EU, which are:

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as established in various case laws such as Schumacker, Marks & Spencer, ITCAR, De Groot etc., which ensures EU law prevails (Erich Ciola) and Member States (MS) refrain from implementing any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU objectives (Art. 4(3) TEU).

In Stauder case law it was also established that EU law should be interpreted applied in a uniform way. Also, in EUROPARK Service it was established that where the matter in hand falls within the remit of harmonization rules, the latter take priority over primary law. Whereas, per Jacob/Jassus should the matter fall outside the remit of harmonization rules, primary law will apply.

It is also worth mentioning that should a dispute arise and be brought before the Court of Justice (of the EU CJEU), the latter will not give a ruling on the interpretation of DTAs (however, it did so in (Austria v Germany), because it was asked to act as an arbitrator), on hypothetical situations, on interpretation of national laws or engage

in fact findings. It might however, offer additional interpretation if it feels appropriate to do so.

Having said all the above, just because a potential breach of a fundamental freedom is identified this does not automatically mean the measure must be withdrawn.

It might be justified and if justified, it could be deemed proportionate (art. 5(4) TEU - principle of proportionality) - see also Cases Cassis de Dijon / Gebhard).

Freedom & Infringement

The currently planned introduction of a group taxation regime by MS A could be against the freedom of establishment, according to Art. 49 TFEU. For Companies also Art. 54 TFEU is relevant, as their seat is treated same as natural persons. In this case the freedom of establishment is concerned and not the free movement of capital, as the latter only deals with the mere investment in a company, with no interest to influence the company, while the freedom of establishment is concerned if influence over a company is there (Lidl Belgium, Dickinger and Ömer, Cadbury Schweppes). The freedom of establishment is infringed, as only national companies in MS A can benefit from the rules of group taxation, while international companies, with subsidiaries outside of MS A cannot benefit from this regime.

Justification and Proportionality

However, the different treatment could be justified in the public interest based on the ground of a balance allocation of taxing powers and the fiscal principle of territoriality (Marks & Spencer, NGI). The infringement of freedom of establishment could also be justified based on the prevention of double dipping (Marks & Spencer). However, in the current case no such justification can be allowed as this infringement hinders the functioning of the internal market. Groups of companies which are not only active within the territory of MS A, but also in MS A and other MS are treated differently from companies only active in MS A.

Conclusion

The planned new legislation is against the freedom of establishment and cannot be justified by reasons of public interest.

We hope the above helps in assessing the planned action. Please let us know in case of any questions.

Yours sincerely,

ADIT Student

-----ANSWER-2-ABOVE-----

-----ANSWER-3-BELOW-----

Answer-to-Question-__3_Part B

Introcutiion

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Facts

- MS Z imposes environmental tax on companies which extract resources
- For companies which extract renewable resources the tax rate is half.

Infringement of a Fundamental Freedom

The current case could infringe either the fundamental freedom of Establishment or the free movement of Capital. In this case the freedom

of establishment is infringed per Art. 49 TFEU

State Aid Rules 107-109 TFEU

According to Article 107, any aid granted by a MS, is incompatible if four criteria are fulfilled:

1. Granted from state resources

The aid must be granted from state resources, which is the case if it is directly or indirectly granted from these resources), e.g. if it has led to a lower income for the public budget.

2. Economic advantage for recipient

An Economic advantage is granted, if it has any effect (direct or indirect). In the Case GEMO the French government allowed slaughterhouses the free collection of the corpses, which was seen as an economic advantage granted and thus to be aid.

3. Effects/distorts competition and trade between MS

The measure must distort competition, which is the case if it does effect the trade between MS.

4. The measure is Selective

This is the main criteria. The measure is selective if it is targeted at a specific group to get a benefit. E.g. in cases Autogrill, Santander the measure seemed to be applicable for everyone, while indeed the measure applied in reality more to companies involved in international foreign investment (see also case Paint Graphos). A measure can be selective even where it concerns a whole economic sector (case Belgium v Commission).

Analysis

The measure from State Z gives an economic advantage to recipients (companies in renewable energy, the economic advantage is the reduced tax rate. The measure from State Z will distort competition between MS, as it will impact trade between MS. The measure from State Z is granted through state resources, as the reduced tax rate will lead to a lower income for the public budget. The main question will be if this measure from State Z is selective. The measure is selective if it is targeted at a specific group to get a benefit. In this case the measure applies only to companies in the renewable energy sector. The renewable energy sector is not the entire energy sector, however, could still be seen as a

sector for itself. However according to the case law Belgium v Commission a measure can be selective even where it concerns a whole economic sector. Here the benefit will be granted only to companies that extract rapidly-renewable resources, but companies which are involved in extraction of resources and renewable resource cannot benefit. Therefore, the measure is selective. Reasons for justification of the measure are not presented or apparent. Especially the measure is not compatible under Art. 107(2) TFEU. Reasons under Art. 107(3) TFEU (e.g. lit c - development of a certain economic area) have not been presented. Therefore the measure imposes unlawful aid under Art. 107(1) TFEU. The Commission shall either review the aid, 108(1) TFEU or abolish or alter the aid (108(2) TFEU).

Recent cases on State Aid Equin Luxembourg and Spanish Tax Leasing cases).

Conclusion

The measure from MS Z falls under the state aid provision of the EU and presents unlawful state aid under Art. 107(1) TFEU.

-----ANSWER-3-
ABOVE-----

-----ANSWER-4-
BELOW-----

Answer-to-Question-7_Part C

From: ADIT Student
TO: Whom ever this may concern
Subject: Report on Implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS Project in EU -
specific measures and instruments chosen

Dear Sir or Madame,

We have been asked to prepare a report on the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS Project in EU, including the specific measures and instruments chosen.

Introduction - OECD BEPS Project

The OECD BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting) report was published in 2013 and included 15 Action Points, with the recommendation for OECD countries to act on them. The issues identified where to fight tax avoidance and evasion via a newly proposed set of rules, updated to the stand of development of the economy and taxpayers as stakeholders therein.

The OECD BEPS project has identified critical areas to act as the digital economy, hybrid-mismatches, CFC rules, anti-abuse mechanisms, transfer pricing etc.

Measures and Instruments

The EU response to the OECD BEPS project where

- implementation of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation for automatic information Exchange (DAC 1-8).
- this includes tax rulings, Country-by-Country Reporting and the exchange of information on tax planning schemes.
- The CCCTB and BEFIT proposals
- The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD)
- and working on tax good governance.

ATAD

The ATAD Directive has introduced a new minimum level of protection, Art. 3 ATAD.

The ATAD Directive includes five new important rules, which are

- Art. 4 Interest limitation rule (BEPS Action 4)
- Art. 5 Exit taxation (not part of BEPS project)
- Art. 6 General anti abuse rule (not part of BEPS project)
- Art. 7 and 8 - Controlled Foreign Company Rules (CFC) (BEPS Action 3)
- Art. 9 and 9a - Hybrid Mismatch Rules (BEPS Action 2).

The EU has also introduced ATAD II and III Directives. ATAD II focusing on hybrids and ATAD III (from 2021, not implemented yet) on shell companies.

DAC 1-8

The EU has also implemented several Directives on Administrative Cooperation in the field of Taxation (DAC). DAC was implemented due to a lack of harmonization and the need for enhanced tax administrative cooperation to fight against tax fraud and evasion. DAC applies to all taxes, except VAT and Excise Duties. DAC allows tax administrations to exchange information foreseeably relevant (DAC preamble para. 9), which are not „fishing expeditions“ from tax authorities.

The following DAC Directives have been introduced:

DAC 1 - exchange of information - non-financial information such as employee income and directors fees

DAC 2- exchange of information on financial income (interest, dividends) - relevant for CRS

DAC 3 - Exchange of cross border rulings and APAs

DAC 4 - Country-by-Country Reporting (based on BEPS)

DAC 5 - Beneficial owner information and anti money laundering via KYC-data

DAC 6 - reporting on certain tax structurings

DAC 7 - Reporting on information on sells on Platforms in EU

DAC 8 - reporting on crypto-asset holders in EU (effective 1.1.2026)

Pillar One and Two

More recently the OECD has introduced the Reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two. These reports are a further measure to fight tax avoidance and evasion in the age of a digital economy. Pillar one focuses on the apportionment of profits according to specific rules, to ensure every country gets their fair share of taxes. However, Pillar One could not reach agreement between states to be implemented yet. Pillar Two introduced a new minimum tax rate for every country. Pillar Two has been widely implemented (even though recent developments may lead to a roll-back, e.g. USA). Pillar two has been implemented by the EU through the GloBE directive, which has already been implemented from most Member States (MS), to ensure a minimum tax rate is being applied.

Conclusion

The via BEPS project has identified issues on direct taxation have been implemented in the EU via the measure of Directives (in accordance to the competence of the EU in the field of direct taxation, Art. 4,5 TEU). There have been multiple measures been implemented by the EU following the BEPS project (as outlines above). Yet, further measures are expected

to be seen to continue combating tax evasion and avoidance.

We hope this report clarifies the issue. Please let us know in case of any questions.

Yours sincerely,

ADIT Student

-----ANSWER-4-ABOVE-----

-----ANSWER-5-BELOW-----

Answer-to-Question-_5_Part C

Introduction

The latter will discuss if the fundamental freedoms may resolve economic and judicial double taxation.

Fundamental Freedoms

The EU primary law has fundamental freedoms, which are as follows:

- Free movement of citizens (move and reside freely) - Art. 21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
- Free movement of goods - Art. 28 TFEU
- Free movement of Workers - Art. 45 TFEU
- Freedom of Establishment (FoE) - Art. 49 TFEU
- Free movement of Services - Art. 56 TFEU
- Free movement of Capital (FMoC) - Art. 63 TFEU.

Member States (MS) are bound the the fundamental freedoms, to ensure the functining of the EU internal market, Art. 26 TFEU. MS shall refrain from any kind of discrimination, e.g. on grounds of nationality (which is prohibited), Art. 18 TFEU.

Competence of the EU for Taxation

It is important to note that the EU does have competence for indirect taxation (Art. 4 TEU-Treaty on European Union; Art. 3 TFEU). However, the EU does not have competence in the field of indirect taxation. But in the field of indirect taxation the EU may act under the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5 (3) TEU), which gives the EU competence in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, if a purpose for the internal market can be better achieved at Union level. For direct taxation the EU may exercise the competence through EU secondary law e.g. via a Directive.

Economic and Judicial Double Taxation

Economic double taxation is when the same taxable event is being taxed twice. Judicial double taxation arises when two different jurisdictions claim taxing rights on the same taxable income.

The power to allocate taxing rights is with the individual MS. However, MS as part of their shared competence under Art. 4 TFEU are required to ensure their legislation complies with EU laws under the principle of Supremacy (Costa v Enel Case).

Therefore, if a conflict arises between national laws and EU laws (which could lead to double taxation), EU laws take priority. This is also the case if a double taxation agreement is applicable (Avoir Fiscal Case).

Positive/negative Integration and CJEU

The EU may act via positive integration - legislation (e.g. Directive like Parent-Subsidiary directive) to resolve direct tax issues on potential double taxation or via negative integration, by the application of the EU fundamental freedoms. The correct application of the fundamental freedoms is being ruled on by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The harmonization of EU direct tax law via the application of EU fundamental freedoms is the negative integration.

The CJEU however does not give judgement on Double Tax Agreements between States, as they do not fall under CJEU competence. However, in Austria v Germany the CJEU has acted as an elected Arbitrator in a DTA case.

If there is an infringement of a fundamental freedom which leads to an double taxation the CJEU may ask the MS to release the infringement, which can resolve the double taxation. An double taxation agreement (DTA) implemented can also serve as a ground of Justification of the infringement of a fundamental freedom, if the DTA effective resolves the double taxation.

Conclusion

Fundamental freedoms may resolve double taxation in many cases. However, their main objective is not to resolve double taxation, but to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Therefore, in many cases double taxation is not being resolved via the fundamental freedoms. If double taxation is being resolved via fundamental freedoms, this happens through negative integration from the applcaiton of these freedoms from the CJEU. A DTA serve as a justification of an infringement of a fundamental freedom, if double taxation is being resolved.